Cyber-Informed Engineering for Water Systems: Protection a Small Utility Can Afford
Most water utilities will never staff a security operations center. They can still make sure no command sent to a chemical feed pump is able to poison the supply.
By Timothy Porritt · Porritt Inc. · November 21, 2026
The water sector has a structural problem. There are tens of thousands of community water systems in the United States, most of them small, many with a single operator who is also the electrician and the IT department. Advice that begins “deploy continuous network monitoring” does not land in that setting. Cyber-Informed Engineering does, because much of it can be done with a wrench and a set of drawings.
What Has Already Happened
In February 2021, an operator at the water treatment plant in Oldsmar, Florida, reported watching the sodium hydroxide setpoint on his screen jump from about 100 parts per million to more than 11,000. He reversed it immediately. Accounts of the cause have varied since, but the engineering point does not depend on who moved the cursor: the control system would accept a setpoint more than a hundred times normal.
In late 2023, a water authority in western Pennsylvania had a booster station controller defaced by attackers who targeted an internet-exposed programmable logic controller with default credentials. The station was switched to manual operation and service continued.
Both cases point the same way. The weak spots were ordinary, and what saved the day was a person and a manual mode.
The Consequences That Matter
For a drinking water system the unacceptable outcomes are few: delivering unsafe water, losing pressure across the distribution system, and damaging pumps or treatment equipment that take months to replace. For wastewater, add an uncontrolled discharge. Start from those and work backward to the digital actions that could cause them.
Low-Cost Engineered Barriers
- Size chemical feed so overdose is physically limited. A metering pump and day tank sized for the plant’s real maximum dose cannot deliver a dangerous one, whatever the setpoint says.
- Put hard limits in the device, not only the HMI. Clamp setpoint ranges in the controller and, where possible, with mechanical stroke limits on the pump.
- Keep an independent check on finished water. An analyzer with a hardwired alarm or shutdown that does not pass through the main control system, backed by routine grab samples.
- Protect pumps mechanically. Pressure relief, surge control, and hardwired low-suction and high-discharge trips prevent damage from bad commands.
- Preserve manual operation. Hand-off-auto switches that work, operators who have run the plant in hand recently, and written procedures for doing so.
- Remove remote access that is not needed. Where it is needed, make it something an operator turns on for a task and turns off after.
Know What You Depend On
Water systems depend on electric power, chemical deliveries, and communications, and hospitals, fire protection, and power plants depend on water. Mapping those dependencies is one of the CIE principles and often reveals that a few hours of storage or a portable generator connection is the most valuable resilience investment available.
Fit With Existing Requirements
America’s Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 requires community water systems serving more than 3,300 people to conduct risk and resilience assessments and maintain emergency response plans. A consequence-first review of the kind described here feeds directly into both, and its findings are usually things a small utility can act on within its own capital and maintenance budget.
Why It Matters
Water is the critical infrastructure with the least security staffing and the most direct path to public health. An approach that asks for engineering judgment instead of new headcount is one the sector can actually adopt, and it is most effective when written into the next plant upgrade or control system replacement.
For a structured way to run the review, see the CIE Implementation Checklist. For background, see What Is Cyber-Informed Engineering? and CIE for Utilities.
Related reading
- What Is Cyber-Informed Engineering? A Plain-Language Guide for Engineers
- The INL CIE Framework Explained: The 12 Principles in Working Terms
- A Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Checklist for Plant and Utility Teams
- CIE vs. Traditional OT Security: What Changes When Engineers Own the Problem
Timothy Porritt is founder of Porritt Inc., building AI-powered tools for process safety, engineering compliance, and industrial operations. Based in Salt Lake City, Utah. Questions about applying Cyber-Informed Engineering to a specific facility: timothy@porrittinc.com.

