A Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Checklist for Plant and Utility Teams
A working checklist for a first CIE review of one system: who to invite, what to ask, and what to write down.
By Timothy Porritt · Porritt Inc. · November 21, 2026
Frameworks are easier to agree with than to start. This checklist is built for a first Cyber-Informed Engineering review of a single system, sized to fit in a one- or two-day workshop with the people who already know the plant. It follows the logic of Idaho National Laboratory’s CIE principles without requiring the team to learn the vocabulary first.
Before the Session
- Pick one bounded system: a process unit, a pump station, a substation, a boiler.
- Invite operations, process or electrical engineering, controls and instrumentation, maintenance, safety, and whoever handles OT security.
- Gather current drawings: process and instrumentation diagrams or one-lines, control narratives, cause-and-effect charts, and a network diagram.
- Bring the most recent hazard analysis or protection study. Much of the consequence work has already been done there.
Step 1: Name the Unacceptable Consequences
- List the outcomes the organization cannot tolerate from this system: injury, release, equipment destruction, extended loss of service.
- Keep the list short. Five to ten items is typical.
- Rank them, and agree on which ones justify an engineered barrier regardless of cost.
Step 2: Inventory What Is Programmable
- List every device with firmware or configurable logic: controllers, safety systems, drives, relays, analyzers, smart transmitters, packaged equipment controls.
- For each, note what it can command and who can change its configuration, from where, with what tool.
- Flag vendor remote access, shared engineering workstations, and anything reachable from the business network.
Step 3: Trace Digital Paths to Each Consequence
- For each consequence, ask: which commands, setpoints, or logic changes could produce it?
- Assume the digital devices involved act together and at the worst time.
- Include loss of view and false indication, not only false commands. Operators acting on wrong data can cause the event themselves.
Step 4: Check for an Engineered Control
- For each path, identify the barrier that does not depend on software: relief device, mechanical stop, hardwired trip, physical capacity limit, key interlock.
- Confirm it is independent. A hardwired trip that takes its signal through the same controller is not.
- Where none exists, record the gap and the simplest physical fix.
Step 5: Simplify
- Identify functions, ports, protocols, and connections that operations does not use. Plan to remove or disable them.
- Question convenience features on critical devices, especially remote configuration.
- Reduce shared dependencies between the control system and the safety or protection system.
Step 6: Plan for Operating Without the Digital Layer
- Can the system be run or safely shut down in manual? Who has done it, and when?
- Are local indicators sufficient to operate without the HMI?
- How long can degraded operation continue, and what limits it?
- Are clean backups of logic and settings stored offline, and has a restore been tested?
Step 7: Look Outward
- List what the system needs from outside: power, communications, utilities, vendors.
- Review procurement language for the next control system purchase.
- Decide who may hold detailed engineering information and how it is shared with contractors.
What to Write Down
Produce a single table: consequence, digital pathway, existing engineered control, gap, recommended action, owner, and target date. Sort it by consequence severity. That table is the deliverable, and it should enter the same action-tracking system as hazard analysis recommendations so it is not orphaned.
After the First Review
- Close the low-cost items quickly: disable unused functions, clamp setpoint ranges, restore and exercise manual modes.
- Schedule the physical modifications with the next outage or turnaround.
- Add the Step 1 through Step 4 questions to the management of change and new-project design review procedures.
- Repeat on the next most critical system.
Why It Matters
The first review nearly always finds at least one scenario where the only thing between a bad command and real damage is a password. Finding it in a conference room costs a day.
For the reasoning behind each step see What Is Cyber-Informed Engineering? and The INL CIE Framework Explained. Sector-specific notes are in CIE for Utilities, CIE for Water Systems, and CIE and Nuclear Facilities.
Related reading
- What Is Cyber-Informed Engineering? A Plain-Language Guide for Engineers
- The INL CIE Framework Explained: The 12 Principles in Working Terms
- CIE vs. Traditional OT Security: What Changes When Engineers Own the Problem
- Cyber-Informed Engineering for Utilities: Designing the Grid to Fail Safely
Timothy Porritt is founder of Porritt Inc., building AI-powered tools for process safety, engineering compliance, and industrial operations. Based in Salt Lake City, Utah. Questions about applying Cyber-Informed Engineering to a specific facility: timothy@porrittinc.com.


