Cyber-Informed Engineering and Nuclear Facilities: What the Industry Already Does, and What Changes With Digital I&C

Unoccupied reactor control console with glowing indicator lights

Cyber-Informed Engineering and Nuclear Facilities: What the Industry Already Does, and What Changes With Digital I&C

Nuclear plants were practicing consequence-driven design long before the term existed. The open question is how to keep that discipline as analog systems give way to digital ones.

By Timothy Porritt · Porritt Inc. · November 21, 2026

If any industry has a head start on Cyber-Informed Engineering, it is nuclear power. Defense-in-depth, single-failure criteria, independence and diversity of safety systems, and conservative design margins all predate the term. A reactor protection system built from analog bistables and hardwired relays is an engineered control in the purest CIE sense: there is no software to compromise.

The reason CIE matters for nuclear is that this situation is changing.

The Regulatory Baseline

In the United States, 10 CFR 73.54 requires power reactor licensees to protect digital systems associated with safety, security, and emergency preparedness functions from cyber attack. Licensees implement it through cyber security plans built on NRC and industry guidance, identifying critical digital assets and placing them within a defensive architecture of graded levels, with one-way data flow out of the most protected levels.

That framework is largely about protecting digital assets. CIE adds the upstream question: how much should any digital asset be able to do in the first place?

What Changes With Digital I&C

Operating plants are replacing obsolete analog instrumentation and control with digital platforms. The benefits are real: better diagnostics, fewer spurious trips, parts that can still be bought. The cost is that functions once performed by independent hardware may now share processors, software, networks, and engineering tools.

The nuclear industry already analyzes this risk for software faults under the heading of diversity and defense-in-depth, asking what happens if a common-cause failure disables redundant digital channels at once. CIE asks the same question with intent added: what if the common cause is deliberate, and chosen to coincide with a plant transient?

CIE Principles Applied to a Plant

  • Consequence-focused design. The unacceptable consequences are already defined by the safety analysis. The CIE task is to trace which digital systems could initiate or aggravate them.
  • Engineered controls. Retain diverse, non-software means for the most important functions, such as a hardwired manual trip and passive safety features that need no control action at all.
  • Design simplification. Digital platforms ship with capabilities a safety function does not need. Remove or disable them at the design stage.
  • Engineering information control. Logic, setpoints, and configuration files for safety systems need the same care as the systems themselves.
  • Supply chain controls. Qualification of digital equipment should cover how firmware and tools are developed, delivered, and verified.

Advanced Reactors and Microreactors

New designs raise the stakes. Many advanced reactors and microreactors are digital from the start and are proposed with smaller on-site staffs, remote monitoring, and in some concepts a degree of autonomous operation. Those features are central to their economics. They also concentrate function in software.

The advantage new designs have is that they can apply CIE on a clean sheet. Passive heat removal, inherent reactivity feedback, and physically limited control ranges are engineered controls that no command can override. A design that can show its safety case holds even if the control system is assumed hostile has a simpler story to tell its regulator and its customers.

Balance of Plant Is Not Exempt

Attention tends to focus on the reactor, but the turbine, feedwater, electrical distribution, and cooling systems can challenge the plant and cost months of generation if damaged. For a facility selling process heat or power to a co-located customer, the interface with that customer’s systems is another dependency to evaluate.

Why It Matters

Nuclear’s safety culture is an asset here, but the habit of treating cyber as a compliance program separate from design engineering is a risk. The plants being modernized and the reactors being licensed this decade will set the pattern for decades of operation.

For the principles referenced above see The INL CIE Framework Explained; for the general method see What Is Cyber-Informed Engineering?.

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Timothy Porritt is founder of Porritt Inc., building AI-powered tools for process safety, engineering compliance, and industrial operations. Based in Salt Lake City, Utah. Questions about applying Cyber-Informed Engineering to a specific facility: timothy@porrittinc.com.

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