What Is Cyber-Informed Engineering? A Plain-Language Guide for Engineers
CIE moves cybersecurity out of the server room and into the design basis: decide what must never happen, then engineer the plant so a digital failure cannot cause it.
By Timothy Porritt · Porritt Inc. · November 21, 2026
Most industrial cybersecurity starts with the network: segment it, monitor it, patch it. Cyber-Informed Engineering starts somewhere else. It starts with the physical process and asks an engineering question: if every digital device in this plant did the worst thing it is physically capable of doing, what would happen, and what would stop it?
That shift in starting point is the whole idea. CIE treats a cyber attack the way engineers already treat overpressure, loss of cooling, or a seismic event: as a hazard to be designed against, not only a threat to be detected.
Where CIE Came From
CIE was developed at Idaho National Laboratory, drawing on years of work on how digital systems fail and how they can be attacked in energy infrastructure. In June 2022 the U.S. Department of Energy published the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy, and in 2023 INL followed with a CIE Implementation Guide that organizes the practice into twelve principles and a set of questions to ask at each stage of a system’s life.
The premise behind both documents is blunt: a sufficiently capable and patient adversary should be assumed able to get into a digital system. If that is true, then security controls alone cannot carry the full weight of protecting a critical function. Engineering has to carry some of it.
The Core Idea in Three Questions
CIE can be reduced to three questions that any design review can ask:
- What must never happen? Identify the small number of consequences the organization cannot accept: loss of life, loss of containment, long-term loss of a critical service, destruction of long-lead equipment.
- Can a digital system cause it? Trace how control logic, setpoints, firmware, engineering workstations, and remote access could drive the process toward those consequences, whether by attack, error, or malfunction.
- What non-digital barrier stops it? Where the answer to the second question is yes, add or preserve a control that software cannot override: a mechanical relief device, a hardwired interlock, a physical limit, a manual mode operators can actually run.
We work through these questions in more detail in Consequence-Driven Design: Three Questions Before the First Line Is Drawn.
What CIE Changes in Practice
The practical effect shows up in ordinary design decisions. A pump that can be dead-headed by a bad command gets a mechanical relief path, not just a software high-pressure trip. A safety function that shares a network with the basic control system gets separated, or gets an analog backup. A feature nobody needs, such as remote firmware update on a protective relay, gets disabled or designed out, because every unneeded function is attack surface.
None of this is exotic. Process safety engineers will recognize it as layers-of-protection thinking with one added assumption: the digital layers may fail together, on purpose, at the worst possible moment.
Why It Matters
Three trends make CIE more than an academic framework. Industrial systems are being digitized and connected faster than they can be secured. Incidents such as the 2015 attack on Ukrainian distribution utilities and the 2017 malware aimed at a petrochemical plant’s safety instrumented system showed that adversaries study the process, not just the network. And the cost of an engineered barrier is lowest at the design stage and highest after startup.
What CIE Is Not
CIE does not replace firewalls, monitoring, or standards such as IEC 62443 and NERC CIP. It sits upstream of them. The comparison is covered in CIE vs. Traditional OT Security, and the twelve principles are explained one by one in The INL CIE Framework Explained.
Where to Start
Start small. Pick one unit or one substation, list its unacceptable consequences, and walk the three questions with operations, controls, and safety engineers in the same room. The CIE Implementation Checklist gives a structure for that first session.
Related reading
- The INL CIE Framework Explained: The 12 Principles in Working Terms
- A Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Checklist for Plant and Utility Teams
- CIE vs. Traditional OT Security: What Changes When Engineers Own the Problem
- Cyber-Informed Engineering for Utilities: Designing the Grid to Fail Safely
Timothy Porritt is founder of Porritt Inc., building AI-powered tools for process safety, engineering compliance, and industrial operations. Based in Salt Lake City, Utah. Questions about applying Cyber-Informed Engineering to a specific facility: timothy@porrittinc.com.


