This is a technical position paper stating Porritt Inc.'s engineering view. It is not a peer-reviewed publication and does not report experimental results. Where it forecasts capability, it is stating design intent rather than achieved performance.
Physical attack is rising
Publicly reported attacks on electrical infrastructure have increased. The assets are dispersed, lightly staffed, and individually significant to grid stability.
Coverage versus attention
Camera coverage without attention is forensic, not preventive. Footage explains what happened; it rarely prevents it.
Detect early, cue a human
Milliwatt sensing makes perimeter-wide coverage economically possible. Fusion reduces it to alerts a small team can actually act on.
Already under supervision
These are the facilities our balance-of-plant stack already supervises. Threat detection becomes one more plant system on the same operator picture.
We believe perimeter protection for energy infrastructure is limited by attention economics rather than sensor availability. Reducing alert volume matters more than adding cameras.
Discuss the approach.
Teaming and technical discussion welcome.
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